





# AI Security and Safety: The PRAlab Research Experience

Ambra Demontis, Maura Pintor, Luca Demetrio, Angelo Sotgiu, Daniele Angioni, Giorgio Piras, Srishti Gupta, **Battista Biggio**, Fabio Roli

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# **PRALab – Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering**

- Pattern Recognition and Application Laboratory
  - DIEE, University of Cagliari, Italy
- ~30 people working mainly on:
  - Biometric Recognition
  - Video Surveillance
  - Cybersecurity
  - AI/ML Security
- Recent projects on AI Security
  - HE Sec4AI4Sec 2023-2025
  - HE ELSA 2022-2024
  - PRIN 2017 RexLearn
  - FFG Comet Module S3AI

- 25+ research projects (last 10 years)
- 8 EU projects (2 coordinated)
- 1.5 M€ EU funding
- More than 3M€ overall funding
- 400k€ yearly turnover





# The Elephant in the Room: Adversarial Examples

- AI/ML successful in many applications
  - Computer Vision
  - Speech Recognition
  - Cybersecurity
  - Healthcare

- ... but extremely fragile against adversarial examples
  - Carefully-perturbed inputs that mislead classification



school bus (94%)





=





ostrich (97%)





#### **Attacks against AI are Pervasive!**



Sharif et al., Accessorize to a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-ofthe-art face recognition, ACM CCS 2016



"without the dataset the article is useless"

"okay google browse to evil dot com"

Carlini and Wagner, *Audio adversarial examples: Targeted attacks on speechto-text*, DLS 2018 <u>https://nicholas.carlini.com/code/audio\_adversarial\_examples/</u>



Eykholt et al., *Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification*, CVPR 2018



- Demetrio, Biggio, Roli et al., Adversarial EXEmples: ..., ACM TOPS 2021
- Demetrio, Biggio, Roli et al., *Functionality-preserving black-box* optimization of adversarial windows malware, IEEE TIFS 2021
- Demontis, Biggio, Roli et al., Yes, Machine Learning Can Be More Secure!..., IEEE TDSC 2019



#### **Pioneers of AI/ML Security**

- Our team is internationally recognized among the pioneers of AI/ML security
  - we have been the first to discover the impact of gradient-based attacks on ML models

Attacker's Capability

Test data

Training data

we have been the first to discover and systematize adversarial attacks on AI/ML, prior to their application to deep learning



#### Attacker's Goal Misclassifications that do Misclassifications that Querving strategies that reveal confidential information on the not compromise normal compromise normal system operation learning model or its users system operation Availability Privacy / Confidentiality Integrity Evasion (a.k.a. adversarial Sponge attacks Model extraction / stealing examples) Model inversion (hill climbing) Membership inference Backdoor poisoning (to allow DoS poisoning (to subsequent intrusions) - e.g., maximize classification

B. Biggio and F. Roli, Wild Patterns: Ten Years After the Rise of Adversarial Machine Learning, Pattern Recognition, 2018 - 2021 Best Paper Award and Pattern Recognition Medal

error)

backdoors or neural trojans

B. Biggio, B. Nelson, and P. Laskov, *Poisoning Attacks against SVMs,* ICML 2012 - ICML 2022 Test of Time Award



## **Main Research Directions**

#### **Attacks on Machine Learning**

**ECML '13 / ICML '12, '15:** Pioneering work on gradient-based evasion and poisoning attacks

**USENIX Sec. '19:** Transferability of evasion and poisoning attacks

IEEE TDSC '19, IEEE TIFS/ACM TOPS '21: Adversarial perturbations on Android and Windows malware

**ECML '20:** Poisoning attacks on algorithmic fairness

NeurIPS '21: Fast Minimum-Norm attacks

NeurIPS '22: Indicators of Attack Failures

WACV '23: Phantom Sponges

**Robust Learning and Detection Mechanisms** 

**IEEE Symp. S&P '18:** Robust learning against training data poisoning

**IEEE TDSC '19:** Optimal/robust linear SVM against adversarial attacks (use case on Android malware)

**NEUCOM '21:** Fast adversarial example rejection

**IEEE TPAMI '21:** Learning with domain knowledge to improve robustness against adversarial examples







# **Ineffective Defenses and Flawed Evaluations**

#### **Detect and Avoid Flawed Evaluations**

- **Problem**: formal evaluations do not scale, adversarial robustness evaluated mostly empirically, via gradient-based attacks
- Gradient-based attacks can fail: many flawed evaluations have been reported, with defenses easily broken by adjusting/fixing the attack algorithms





Pintor, Biggio, et al., *Indicators of Attack Failure: Debugging and Improving Optimization of Adversarial Examples*, NeurIPS 2022

## **Indicators of Attack Failure**





Pintor, Biggio, et al., *Indicators of Attack Failure: Debugging and Improving Optimization of Adversarial Examples*, NeurIPS 2022







Pintor, Biggio, et al., *Indicators of Attack Failure: Debugging and Improving Optimization of Adversarial Examples*, NeurIPS 2022

# What's Next?

# What's Next?

Use-Inspired Basic Research Questions from the Pasteur's Quadrant

- Studying ML Security may help understand and debug ML models... but
- ... can we use MLSec to help solve some of today's industrial challenges?
  - To improve robustness/accuracy over time, requiring less frequent retraining
  - To detect OOD examples and provide reliable predictions (confidence values)
  - To improve maintainability and interpretability of deployed models (update procedures)
  - To learn reliably from noisy/incomplete labeled datasets

 Basic
 Use-inspired

 research
 Use-inspired

 (Niels Bohr)
 Louis Pasteur)

 Applied
 research

 (Thomas Edison)
 Chomas Edison

Consideration for use

• **Challenge:** to build more reliable and practical ML models using MLSec / AdvML



...



# **Open Course on MLSec**

https://github.com/unica-mlsec/mlsec



https://github.com/pralab



## **Machine Learning Security Seminars**



https://www.youtube.com/c/MLSec

#### **The ELSA Project**





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Battista Biggio battista.biggio@unica.it @biggiobattista

# Thanks!